Damon Jones v. Lori Lapina by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-7-2011 
Damon Jones v. Lori Lapina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Damon Jones v. Lori Lapina" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 253. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/253 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
GLD-012        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1964 
____________ 
 
DAMON JONES, 
    Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
LORI LAPINA, Physician Assistant; 
STANLEY FALOR, Physician; 
JOHN OR JANE DOE, Medical Record Supervisor 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-01209) 
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 14, 2011 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 7, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Damon Jones, a state prisoner, appeals from the District Court‟s order 
dismissing his civil action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the 
reasons that follow, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous. 
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 In a prior civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones v. Falor, D.C. 
Civ. No. 04-cv-00015, Jones alleged that numerous defendants violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights by failing to provide an adequate course of medical treatment for a left 
knee injury.  Defendants Dr. Stanley Falor, Lori Lapina, K. Diddle, Dr. Morris Harper, 
and Prison Health Services, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and 
attached Jones‟s extensive medical record as an exhibit to their motion.  The remaining 
defendants filed a separate motion, arguing that Jones failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.  After the Magistrate Judge concluded that Jones failed to show 
deliberate indifference on the part of the medical defendants, and that the non-medical 
defendants likewise could not be found liable, the District Court, on November 30, 2004, 
granted summary judgment for the defendants.  Jones appealed. 
 After a careful review of the record, we determined that the appeal was frivolous, 
see Jones v. Falor, 135 Fed. App‟x 554 (3d Cir. 2005).  In pertinent part, we explained:  
Jones‟s knee injury was initially identified in mid-2002.  He was referred 
for an MRI examination in August 2002 and found to have a meniscus tear.  
In February 2003, Jones was referred to an orthopedist, who recommended 
surgery.  That surgery was performed on March 31, 2003.  Jones was 
afforded post-operative physical therapy and numerous follow-up visits 
with prison medical staff.  On this record, we find no evidence from which 
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant medical 
personnel were deliberately indifferent to Jones‟s needs with regard to his 
left knee.  Although Jones complains primarily about the timing of his 
treatment, a rational jury could not conclude that the medical defendants 
impermissibly denied, delayed, or prevented Jones from receiving needed 
treatment. 
 
Id. at 556.  The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 2, 2006. 
 In the meantime, on September 13, 2006, Jones filed the instant civil rights action 
against Lapina, Dr. Falor, and a John Doe medical records supervisor, alleging that the 
medical records Lapina and Dr. Falor submitted in support of their motion for summary 
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judgment in the prior civil action, were “inadequate and inaccurate,” and “deliberately 
falsified.”  Complaint, at ¶ 2.  The Complaint alleged numerous alterations of Jones‟s 
medical records from late 2001, through 2002, and into early 2003.  The defendants filed 
a motion to dismiss Jones‟s latest civil rights complaint.  After he failed to respond to the 
motion, the District Court, in an order entered on June 25, 2008, granted it and dismissed 
the complaint.  Jones then filed a post-judgment motion, seeking an opportunity to 
respond to the defendants‟ motion to dismiss.   
After some confusion which we need not recount here, the case was reopened and 
Jones was permitted to respond in opposition to the defendants‟ motion to dismiss, see 
Jones v. Lapina, 349 Fed. App‟x 794 (3d Cir. 2009).  Once the case was reopened, Jones 
was able to submit his response, and numerous exhibits.  After Jones also submitted a 
second or “renewed” response, the defendants sought and received leave to reply.  In 
their reply, the defendants argued that Jones was barred from litigating the second civil 
rights action by the doctrine of claim preclusion.  The Magistrate Judge then 
recommended that the action be dismissed on the basis of claim preclusion, reasoning 
that the instant action involved the same parties, the same facts, and the same injury as 
Jones‟s previous action filed at D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00015.  In both suits, the acts 
complained of, the material facts alleged, and the witnesses and documentation required 
to prove the allegations, all were the same.  In addition, Jones had the information he 
needed to raise his fraud argument in his 2004 civil action.  The District Court, in an 
order entered on March 31, 2011, granted the defendants‟ motion to dismiss, denied as 
moot Jones‟s motion to substitute an Executor for Dr. Falor, and adopted the Report and 
Recommendation as the opinion of the court.   
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Jones appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk granted 
him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to 
summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third 
Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit argument in writing, and he has 
done so. 
 We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous.  An appellant may prosecute his appeal 
without prepayment of the fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), but the in forma pauperis statute 
provides that the Court shall dismiss the appeal at any time if the Court determines that it 
is frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  An appeal is frivolous when it lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  The 
defense of claim preclusion may be raised and adjudicated on a motion to dismiss.  See 
Connelly Found. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 461 F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir.1972).  A 
court may take judicial notice of the record from a previous court proceeding between the 
parties.  See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 In argument in support of this appeal, Jones contends that his case involves a fraud 
upon the court which he could not have raised previously.  See Argument in Support of 
Appeal, at 1-2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)).  He argues that application of the doctrine 
of claim preclusion in his case would be contrary to Rule 60(b).  We reject these 
arguments as meritless.  First, Jones has confused the instant action for legal and 
equitable fraud with an assertion of fraud upon the court pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) (“On 
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for … * * (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 
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extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party….”)  And, had he 
actually filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion in his 2004 action, it would have been subject to 
dismissal as untimely filed, see Rule 60(c)(1) (“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made 
within a reasonable time  -- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the 
entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”)  
  Second, the doctrine of claim preclusion “„is not a mere matter of technical 
practice or procedure‟ but „a rule of fundamental and substantial justice.‟”  Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm‟n v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 492 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).  “It is „central 
to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of 
disputes,‟” and seeks to avoid “„the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, 
[while] conserve[ing] judicial resources, and foster[ing] reliance on judicial action by 
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.‟”  Id. (quoting Montana v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). 
The District Court properly applied the doctrine of claim preclusion here.  Claim 
preclusion applies where “there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same 
causes of action.”  United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Whether two causes of action are identical depends, in general, on a consideration 
of (1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for recovery are the same; (2) 
whether the same witnesses and documents will be necessary in the trial in both cases; 
and (3) whether the material facts alleged are the same.  See id. at 984.  Here, there was a 
final judgment in the prior action, the parties are the same, and the assertions in Jones‟s 
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second civil complaint involve the same operative facts as in his 2004 complaint.  In both 
actions, the acts complained of, the material facts alleged, and the witnesses and 
documentation required to prove the allegations all are the same.  With the exception of a 
new legal theory – that his prison medical records were deliberately falsified in order to 
defeat his claim of liability – the two lawsuits are identical, and a new legal theory does 
not make the second case different for purposes of claim preclusion, see Edmundson v. 
Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Claim preclusion … 
prohibits reexamination not only of matters actually decided in prior case, but also those 
that parties might have, but did not, assert in that action.”). 
As the Magistrate Judge concluded, Jones had a full and fair opportunity in his 
prior civil rights action to litigate the accuracy of the medical records on which the 
defendants‟ motion for summary judgment relied.  He could, and should, have raised his 
claim that the records had been falsified in his response to the defendants‟ motion or in 
his objections to the Magistrate Judge‟s Report and Recommendation.  He also could 
have raised it in his motion to alter or amend the judgment, or in his appeal to this Court.  
The information contained in the medical records was not concealed from him; Jones had 
the information he needed to raise his claim of fraud in his prior action.  See Complaint, 
at ¶ 2 (“The defendants‟ motions were forwarded to plaintiff on 11-13-04, through the 
U.S. mail service.  And upon receipt of the motions, plaintiff had discovered that the 
defendants Lapina, Falor and Jane or John Doe, had knowingly and intentionally failed to 
maintain an adequate and accurate medical record for plaintiff‟s medical history.”)  In 
filing a separate and second civil rights action, Jones improperly split his claim.  The 
doctrine of claim preclusion was designed to prevent this, unless the defendants 
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acquiesce (and they did not here), so that judicial economy is promoted and defendants 
are protected from harassment.  See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 
1073 (3d Cir.1990). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
